Sociologists could learn from critical medical scientists' responses to some related ethical dilemmas, as some medical researchers have experienced these issues more acutely and for longer.
Introduction
This article discusses ethical and political problems associated with contemporary research relationships, and researchers' responses to these. While the "research relationship" often appears in the singular, today's researchers frequently face a number of highly mediated and perhaps competing research relationships within an increasingly commodified and contractual research environment. These relationships include their position within their own employing organisation, their relationships with organisations employing their interviewees or of which their interviewees are members (from campaign groups to commercial organisations), their relationships with broader publics who may have an interest in their research, and relationships with ideals which may (or may not) be embodied in the objects or subjects of research.
Such complex, conflicted relationships may be elided by easy talk about "stakeholders" and "users" that portrays external benefits from research as enhancing its value. While researchers should be accountable to others, such assumptions silence power imbalances and competing interests: what happens when benefits to some "stakeholders" harm others? This paper discusses the limits of official and critical approaches to research ethics, and considers whether we can learn from medical scientists' responses to these issues. Dominant frameworks for thinking about research relationships have been imported from medical to social science; regardless of how appropriate social scientists consider this isomorphism to be (e.g. Dingwall 2006 ) medical scientists' responses to ethical and political dilemmas may be instructive. This includes the important issue of how free speech may best be protected when speech is increasingly "interested".
In key sections the paper draws upon two recent research projects: primarily web-based research into "insider critics" of medicine, and an in-depth sociological case study into NHS organisations in the context of growing corporate involvement in health care. The former informs comparisons made between medical and social researchers, and the latter provides a case in which some ethical and political dilemmas of research relationships were particularly salient. The NHS inspires great loyalty among those who use it, both as embodied in specific places and organisations and as a more amorphous ideal. Yet while appealing to egalitarian principles it comprises a hierarchical and often secretive set of organisations, which may not always welcome public or research scrutiny.
Social researchers need a critical reformulation of research ethics to take account of the increasingly corporatised and bureaucratic contexts within which we work, including our workplaces and our research "objects". Rethinking research ethics with a focus on power and organisations could help to ensure that the new watchword of "relevance" (Demeritt and Lees 2005) is seen in broader and more political terms, not merely as a responsibility to provide material for managers of 
The growth of ethical review
Ethical issues are increasingly discussed "up front" in social and medical science through ethical review procedures. In UK social science the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Research Governance Framework (2005) represents a watershed, as the ESRC is the major funding body for social scientists.
As in the medical research guidelines upon which it draws, informed consent is prioritised, implying that the researcher-researched relationship almost always takes priority over other considerations. In medical science, this principle began to be embedded in regulatory systems after the horrific experimentation revealed during the Nuremberg Trials (Weindling 2004 ). Revelations about scandals within democratic countries, where doctors acting on behalf of the state had disregarded the rights of individuals, encouraged the shift to greater control over medical research. In the UK, the National Health Service is the public healthcare provider and through its research ethics procedures it acts as gatekeeper to medical research populations. It also regulates social research involving NHS patients, staff, or premises (Richardson and McMullan 2007) .
However, it is unclear why procedures developed in response to medical scandals should apply to social scientists. Dingwall (2006: 51) argues that in social research "risks to human subjects are not comparable [with medical research] and the power relationship between researcher and researched is so different as to render prior scrutiny irrelevant and inappropriate." Although both medical and social research have acted to support elite agendas, the power relationships constructed through each may differ greatly. Medical research exerts power directly upon individual bodies, while social science has tended to contribute to elite knowledges and policy formation "at a distance" (Rose 2006) . Traditionally, sociologists contributed to such agendas through large-scale social surveys providing detailed information on representative samples of citizens. Material from such studies is available for secondary use yet this is not generally seen as ethically problematic in the same way as primary research. Re-using survey data without asking respondents' permission to conduct the new study is not viewed as "covert research", providing that respondents have not opted out of secondary analysis. Instead, the major concern in the ESRC Framework is the relationship between the researcher and her participants in primary research. The six core principles informing the framework are (1) integrity and quality, (2) full disclosure about the research to research staff and subjects, (3) confidentiality and anonymity, (4) voluntary participation by participants, (5) avoidance of harm to participants, and (6) avoiding or disclosing conflicts of interest. Point (2) specifically also makes reference to research staff, stating that informed consent requires that they "need to be made fully aware of the proposed research and its potential risks to them " (2005: 24) . Despite this, the document does not offer more detailed guidance on disclosure to staff, risk management, and harm avoidance, saying only that research governance presumes that an organisation has " [p] rocedures to protect the interests of research staff and research students " (2005: 23 ).
Yet while the framework focuses upon the researcher-researched dyad, in its discussion of harm avoidance it goes beyond this to discuss risks to respondents' organisations and businesses alongside risks to respondents themselves. While the key group constructed as "at risk" are participants, the document goes on to argue that "[i]n addition, researchers should attempt to avoid harm not only to an immediate population of subjects, but to their wider family, kin and community. Research designs should consider potential harm to respondents' organisations or businesses as a result of the work" (2005: 25, emphasis added). Here harm is constructed as harm to organisations and businesses, but not to wider publics (such as groups affected by, but not related to, the research or its participants, either individuals or organisations). This raises complex and disturbing questions. Should researchers investigating an oil company's corporate governance be primarily concerned about potential harms or benefits to people affected by oil exploration, or harms or benefits of the research to the oil company? Might harm to one cause benefit to another, and how would one choose between them? Do we have a responsibility to protect the "fund management community" in the same way as we might underprivileged communities? None of these questions is addressed by the framework, which seems to assume that benefits (to whomever) are "good" and harms (to whomever) are "bad".
Interestingly, the UK Social Research Association's (2003) ethics guide seems more up-to-date in its more overt acknowledgement of competing relationships and interests. Perhaps this is because the ESRC funds academic research, while SRA members are based in the private and public sectors as well as in universities. The SRA is concerned to establish the social legitimacy of researchers working in diverse organisational locations, warning them to respect "moral" as well as "legal" codes of different groups and societies. Its guide suggests that researchers should negotiate control over data and results in advance with funders or employers, and acknowledges that harms and benefits may result to groups not directly affected by the research. Above all researchers are viewed as a professional group wherever they operate, a group that should be allowed significant leeway over its work but which must often cleave to funders' and employers' rights over the research agenda. 
Sociologists respond to ethical review
In response to the growth of ethical guidelines and committees, some sociologists (e.g. Dingwall 2006 ) have argued that our profession is low risk and does not need to be regulated by outsiders. Rather than necessary or democratic, regulation has been characterised as a managerial strategy to police researchers. Critical sociological discussions of research ethics tend to focus on the researcher-researcher dyad. Social scientists (e.g. Oakley 1981) initially concurred with influential medical approaches in conceiving of the research participant as powerless by comparison with the researcher. The conclusion drawn for many scholars taking this standpoint is that one should seek to "level up" the playing field;
as Wilkinson (1986: 13) suggests, "at the very least, both [researcher and researched] are to be regarded as having the same status: as participants or collaborators in the same enterprise." This means giving interviewees more control over the research process, whether through collective participation or individual empowerment.
While the former, more outward-looking approach is embodied in action research aiming to mobilise disadvantaged communities, the latter has produced a researcher-as-therapist model. Kezar (2003: 395) argues that "[a]s a critical theorist, I
believe that I should empower the people I interview to challenge power structures that limit their humanity." Here research may become akin to Paulo Freire-style consciousness-raising; interviewer effects (i.e. the effects of the interviewer upon the interviewee, often characterised as "bias" in positivist methodologies) are the goal of the research. This has led on to more postmodern perspectives that question goals of enlightenment or empowerment, but still focus on the micro-politics of the researcher-researched relationship. Lather (1994: 43) suggests "fostering heterogeneity, refusing closure" through involving participants in writing up research, reporting interactions in multiple voices and co-creating Lyotardian "small narratives".
The researcher-as-therapist model is harder to apply to elite interviewees than when "studying down" or researching social movements, as Kezar acknowledges. Even in the latter case, Daphne Patai argues that "[w]e should not anguish quite so much over our own roles", which have less effect on participants than researchers might like to think. Recent feminist work has revealed power dynamics within researcher-researched dyads as complex and shifting (Tang 2002 ).
The same researcher may be placed in very different ways vis-à-vis interviewees of different "race", class, age, sexuality, or gender. This undermines assumptions that the researcher persona is inherently tied either to power or to empowerment.
The organisational complexity constituting many contemporary research environments further troubles the researcher-as-therapist model. Therapists have classically operated as individual professionals with high levels of control over their working environments (Donald 2001) , a professional position with similarities to the traditional academic labour process at least for a tenured elite. Yet within academia professionals are increasingly constrained, and work in teams rather than alone. The growing extra-academic sector has even less resemblance to the individual toiler within the ivory tower. If it ever existed, the power of the academic worker to empower or enlighten her interviewees is threatened under these conditions. A critical response to the new ethical barrage demands a recognition that most researchers are less like individual therapists and more like professionalised (or in some cases deprofessionalised) employees (Collinson 2004) . Similarly, particularly for those of us working in "post-92" universities 1 , our students no longer fit the traditional humanistic model: they may no longer see themselves only (or even primarily) as learners but also (or instead) as employees and parents. Academia has become casualised: UK higher education trade union UCU reports that nearly half of academic and academic-related staff are now on fixed-term posts, a figure that rises to nearly 85% for research-only staff (UCU undated). While many sociologists would see the discipline as more vocation than occupation (Holmwood and Scott 2007) recognising the structural changes that have taken place provides a clearer position from which to discuss contemporary challenges and to build alternatives for researchers and those whose lives they affect.
Studying power
A shifting sociological gaze towards elites and organisations provides further reason for re-assessing critical research ethics. As Luff (1999: 692) comments, "the emphasis on power-sharing and the vulnerability of the researched that has characterized much feminist methodology...may come from tendencies within feminist research to study the 'powerless' and therefore may not be transferable, indeed may be counter-productive, to the development of feminist theory and practice in research with the "powerful".' Nirmal Puwar refers critically (2004: 71) to "a fascination with the 'down below'" -with subaltern voices as long as they speak in certain ways, on certain topics.
Issues of public interest may produce a responsibility to study underresearched elites. Yet "[t]he principle of informed consent can make it difficult to gain understanding of groups that do not want to be studied, such as business and government elites even if it may be argued that it is in the interests of public accountability that such groups should be studied." (Bell and Bryman 2007: 68 ). An argument often given against studying unwilling respondents is that it could contravene sociologists' obligation not to bring the profession into disrepute.
However, a counter-argument might be that ensuring sociology's reputation as a critical discipline might make elites more willing to expect -and perhaps accept -such criticism. Playing too "safe" can carry its own risks, as Penn and Soothill (2006: 4) have bitterly charted after having their research "buried". Part of this support must be the development of ethical frameworks that speak beyond individual researcher-researched relationships. In hierarchical, corporate and bureaucratised societies, such frameworks are necessarily limited and may leave researchers ill-prepared for conflicts with elites and organisations. Instead, we need ethical guidelines and analyses that also focus upon the organisations and power relations structuring research relationships, particularly where participants are interviewed in their capacity as organisational representatives. I would argue that by involving ourselves with such entities, we take on responsibilities towards those affected by the organisation (positively and negatively). This is more specific than any general duty upon researchers to promote the "public good" through their work; it means that we should think about practical ways to meet these responsibilities, within the multiple ethical and legal constraints that we face. Below I discuss this example more specifically using my case study research within NHS organisations.
Ethics and organisations: researching the NHS
Here I reflect on how organisational power structures affected the ethical issues relating to my research. This involved critically studying NHS LIFT, a privatisation initiative, at both a local and national level through case study research supplemented by documentary analysis (see Aldred 2007) . The ethical issues that I experienced were not recognised in the official NHS "ethics procedures", which assimilate social to medical research procedures (Richardson and McMullan 2007) . Social research's failure to fit the medical paradigm can either delay or obstruct social research or, conversely, minimise the ethical issues that it poses. The ethical issues that I encountered were also, I felt, insufficiently acknowledged in the critical literature, for reasons outlined above. Through discussions with other researchers, I
later learned that these experiences are far from uncommon. For organisational researchers, the need to manage many relationships beyond the immediate researcher-researched dyad (including power relationships between different participants) means that our research does not fit traditional critical models.
In my experience, this played out in relation to a number of ethical principles.
Firstly, although anonymity and confidentiality are frequently portrayed in ethical frameworks as absolutes and universally positive (e.g. ESRC 2005) I found them connected to organisational power dynamics. While some participants demanded or expected confidentiality and anonymity, others wanted grievances and identities revealed. The latter was impossible while respecting the former, and the overwhelming weight of ethical codes prescribe anonymity and confidentiality. Yet I could not help but feel that I was letting down the GP practice manager who wanted me to publicise the dire state of her surgery.
While my work critiqued "closed policy networks and broken chains of communication" (Aldred 2007a ) keeping important information from the public and from research participants, I myself anonymised people, places, and organisations.
However, anonymisation did serve a critical function in that information could be disseminated without particular individuals or organisations being blamed for structural failures. While on balance I feel this was the correct course of action, I
found the dilemmas involved difficult, and would have benefited from the existence of more critical discussion about how (and whether) to operationalise anonymity and confidentiality within organisational research. In many cases it may not be practical to anonymise organisations; for example, where the organisation concerned is a national one easily identifiable by its purpose.
Secondly, informed consent may prove complex when researching organisations. I found the issue problematic when observing private meetings, being reliant upon gatekeepers to allow me access to the meeting and to other participants, and to secure consent from the latter. Particularly where the gatekeeper was a senior manager, it was hard to know to what extent consent was really "informed". Less powerful participants were unlikely to feel able to object to my presence, especially if informed late on. However, this made for a naturalistic setting as such meetings frequently included new and/or unexpected people.
Unease about the imposition of my presence upon clinicians and junior managers was somewhat mitigated by the work that I was attempting to produce.
Unlike the management consultants that sometimes appeared, I was not trying to impose new working relationships, nor to criticise or evaluate individual behaviour.
Rather, using perspectives drawn from institutional and critical ethnographies, I
wanted to assess the workings of a new policy model. I was constantly made aware of how little room to manoeuvre participants experienced, most of whom criticised Part of the problem here is -as Bell and Bryman (2007) suggest -whether organisations and businesses can be seen as analogous to persons. Can researchers be held accountable to the organisations they research, in the same way that they are responsible to the people they research? Should ethical frameworks set up to deal with relationships between two individuals be extrapolated and used to understand relationship between organisations, or between an individual and an organisation? Organisations and businesses are institutions created by people for specific ends, and I do not believe that one should assimilate them to the same ethical paradigm used to discuss responsibilities towards people.
However, organisational research relationships do need to be discussed in ethical terms. While undertaking my case study research I found it impossible to dissociate myself from obligations towards the NHS. More than an actually existing service, the NHS is an ideal and a part of collective memory in the UK (Tudor Hart 2006) . Its goals -public provision of healthcare with equal access to all -motivate both service users and staff. Equally, the NHS is far from an ideal place in which to work. Craft (1995) Where organisations are failing to live up to stated values or to meet user expectations, this needs to be critically understood, even though the immediate impact of research may be seen as negative for the organisation concerned.
The ethical values that helped to guide me through researching the NHS involved commitment to an ethos of public service. This does not necessarily mean loyalty to particular organisations, particularly when their distinctive qualities may be threatened (Hebron et al 2003) . It is not peculiar to public sector organisations but is perhaps most closely associated with services that they have provided. In particular, the NHS has been associated with such an ethos (Tudor Hart 2006 
Critical research and interested speech
Thinking about broader motivations for research recalls the periodic debates within sociology over whether the profession has a broader public mission. Following While sociology may have not have produced the kind of scandals created by medical research, sociologists should resist the temptation to assume that sociology is always morally "safer" than disciplines such as medicine or accounting and No Free Lunch (US-UK). These groups' activities and discourses presuppose an understanding that knowledge is socially-constructed, sometimes against the authors' explicit statements to the contrary . They attempt to change the structural location of medical research, in order to produce data of public rather than primarily commercial interest. Practical solutions are promoted, from legislation and public funding of medical research to ways that professionals can improve research quality.
Critical medical scientists have studied the social construction of academic medical knowledge, in particular corporate research agendas and the commodification of research relationships . Analysing the changing research environment, they have argued over how best to defend researchers' independence from power interests. However, the most prominent recent response from the UK social science community to similar issues lacks similar consideration of the economic, social, and political context shaping attempts to maintain academic independence. This initiative, the new pressure group Academics for Academic Freedom (AFAF, online at www.afaf.org.uk), was largely initiated and supported by social scientists and focuses upon "the right to offend". The concept appears abstract, and it is unclear what the "right to offend" would mean for junior and contract researchers and precisely how it could be defended 3 . The website offers little in the way of advice and support on promoting and developing space for critical research.
Moreover, the "right to offend" is constructed as an elite professional privilege; the website states that "academics, both inside and outside the classroom, [must] have unrestricted liberty to question and test received wisdom and to put forward controversial and unpopular opinions, whether or not these are deemed offensive."
Clearly, this right does not apply to other employees, and the website does not argue that it should. How it might apply to social scientists working outside academiaoften in less prestigious locations, marginalised by professional bodies -is obscure.
But "academic freedom" is contested and its virtue far from guaranteed. It may be used as a managerial defence of privilege (Fine 1994) , or may be the subject of dispute between more and less senior academics, or between academics and students. Within hierarchical communities freedoms will be mobilised within competing strategies, rather than forming a smooth whole.
By contrast to AFAF's vision of unfettered academic freedom, Hind (2007) avoids utopianism and acknowledges the limitations of academic science. He argues that research agendas are far from independent from centres of money and power, and individual academics often have little structural freedom available to challenge such agendas. Thus "freedom of speech" might actually support elite agendas, just as free speech laws have been used to defend advertising. Hind argues that keeping freedom of speech alive in difficult times necessitates the creation of alternative fora in which academics can debate with non-academics.
Social researchers might usefully discuss proposals made by Hind and by medical scientists, and whether these may help to safeguard us and those affected by our work. Thanks to critics, medical science publications now take seriously conflicts of interest, although radical scholars argue that disclosure is inadequate and such conflicts must be ended. However, this issue is relatively new for social researchers; as Bell and Bryman (2007: 67) This vision sees research ethics as practical and critical, neither accepting the label of "business-facing" nor retreating into a defence of existing, traditional, or imagined professional practice.
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